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countries that mean global music piracy rates grew over this period, and observe different mean rates for
OECD and non-OECD countries. We examine the effect of per capita income, legal enforcement and
technology on piracy rates in the developed and developing economies and choose a fixed-effects model. Our
model indicates that variations in piracy of CDs and digital music on CD-Rs among all countries are largely
due to growing Internet subscriptions. For non-OECD countries, the model suggests that the increase in
Internet use coupled with poor copyrights enforcement has worsened piracy. For OECD countries, however,
the growth in Internet subscriptions has not had a significant effect on piracy rates.
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Abstract: 
 
Why has physical piracy of music grown globally in recent years despite international 
efforts to reduce the problem? This research employs cross-country time series data 
analysis to examine physical music piracy rates across developed and developing 
economies. We provide 1999-2004 cross-country evidence from 70 countries that mean 
global music piracy rates grew over this period, and observe different mean rates for 
OECD and non-OECD countries. We examine the effect of per capita income, legal 
enforcement and technology on piracy rates in the developed and developing economies 
and choose a fixed-effects model. Our model indicates that variations in piracy of CDs 
and digital music on CD-Rs among all countries are largely due to growing Internet 
subscriptions. For non-OECD countries, the model suggests that the increase in Internet 
use coupled with poor copyrights enforcement has worsened piracy.  For OECD 
countries, however, the growth in Internet subscriptions has not had a significant effect 
on piracy rates.  
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  A simplistic economic model of music piracy across countries is an inverted U-shaped curve, 
where piracy is very low in countries with low per capita incomes but begins to increase at a decreasing 
rate with increases in income, peaking in the middle income ranges, and decreases at an increasing rate 
with further increases in per capita income.  Moreover, per capita income is closely tied to technology 
access. This model illustrates one of the reasons why music piracy is virtually non-existent in many African 
countries.  
2
  Many thanks to Dr. Martin Asher and Vice Dean Dr. Barbara Khan for giving me the opportunity 
to do this research, to Prof. Kevin Werbach for his insight into the legal issues, to Dad for his support, and 
to my sister, Slavea, for inspiring this research. 
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1  Introduction 
Piracy, generally defined as the illegal reproduction of copyrighted works for sale, 
presents a classic economic problem of market failure arising from asymmetric 
information between buy side and sell side agents and technological changes that 
digitized media and transformed it into a public good available over the Internet. This 
paper focuses on physical music piracy, which is defined as piracy on CDs and other 
recordable delivery devices. Despite this focus, we tackle a topic that has inspired one of 
a number of studies on the problems presented by free access to copyrighted digital 
media. The motivation of the research is the observation that music piracy of CDs and 
CD-Rs has grown over the past several years despite legal efforts by international 
copyrights and trade organizations to lessen it. We believe that implications of our 
findings are relevant to other digital media, including piracy of business and gaming 
software.  
Although researchers have devoted considerable attention to illegal downloading over the 
Internet, the physical piracy of music is an equally compelling problem. Illegal sales of 
music on CDs and CD-Rs today account for a loss of over $4.5 billion dollars annually 
according to a recent report released by the International Federation of the Phonographic 
Industry (IFPI), the leading world music trade researcher.
3
 China continues to make 
IFPI’s list of the top ten pirate markets for music, with capacities for pirated CD 
production at about 19 times the legitimate domestic demand for CDs.
4
  A large fraction 
of these pressed CDs are made for export and smuggled into Europe, Latin America, and 
North America, where CDs are resold for competitive prices similar to those of their 
legitimate counterparts. Moreover, the IFPI estimates that today, more than one in three 
discs sold word-wide is a pirated copy, and pirates outsell legitimate recordings in 30 
countries. As these discs slip into the shadow economy, governments lose a fraction of 
their GDP and tax revenue, while local and international producers and artists are not 
compensated for their efforts.  
The purpose of this research is to determine what factors have influenced the dynamics of 
physical music piracy since 1999 and its variation across countries, with hopes of making 
policy recommendations for developing economies. We use the year 1999 as a 
benchmark since it marked the introduction of the Napster file sharing model, which 
revolutionized the nature of the industry by making digital music available free of charge 
over the Internet. With this research, we hope to answer some fundamental questions, 
such as why piracy has grown overall in the past years. Specifically, where has piracy 
grown and why? Could this growth have been a factor of wider use of computers and 
growing Internet access? Is piracy a factor of income or the degree of legal enforcement 
in a particular country?   
                                                 
3
  Commercial Piracy Report, IFPI 2006. The IFPI defines physical piracy as “the unauthorized 
duplication of an original recording for commercial gain without the consent of the rights owner.” Pirated 
copies can be pressed in unlicensed plants (CDs), or burned in CD labs (CD-Rs), and are later sold on street 
markets or smuggled across boundaries for international sale. 
4
 Commercial Piracy Reports, IFPI 2006, available at www.ifpi.org. 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical background for 
this research and overviews existing scholarly work on this topic. Section 3 discusses the 
data and model selection used in this study, and presents the results. Section 4 concludes 
the paper by summarizing the findings and providing policy recommendations and 
suggestions for future research. 
2 Theoretical Background 
To our knowledge, there have only been two other studies that have examined the 
variation in music piracy rates across countries and time.  We have also found two similar 
studies to this one, which focused on variations in software piracy across countries. 
Marron and Steel (1997), proposed that piracy levels vary with economic, institutional, 
and cultural factors. Using software piracy data, Morrison and Steel confirmed that piracy 
varied among high income and low income countries, specifically, that countries with 
higher per capita income had lower piracy rates.
5
 They also discovered that countries 
with an individualist culture had much lower piracy rates than countries with a 
collectivist culture. Furthermore, piracy also varied based on institutional power for 
copyright enforcement.  
Hui and Png (2002) explored the impact of price and the presence of music piracy on 
legitimate music sales. They developed and tested hypotheses from theoretical models of 
end-user and re-seller piracy on international panel data for 28 countries measuring 1992-
1998 music CD sales. The study found empirical evidence that the demand for music 
CDs decreased with piracy. Hui and Png also discovered that the wide availability of 
pirated copies kept legitimate prices below market potential, such that overall losses 
including price effects may have amounted to 19% of legitimate revenue in 1998. After 
accounting for demand losses and price adjustments, the industry lost about 6.6% of its 
revenues to piracy. The results also indicated that price elasticity of demand of CDs was 
lower in the presence of piracy. Therefore, demand for legitimate copies was less likely 
to rise in response to decreases in price, because pirated copies were still cheaper to 
purchase.  
Fischer and Andres (2005) further pursued the cross-country analysis of piracy in a study 
that used a sample of 71 countries to empirically analyze the relationship between income 
distribution and software piracy rates. They measured income inequality by the Gini 
coefficient and quintile shares and examined a variety of other factors influencing piracy 
rates variation. The study found that income inequality was negatively associated with 
piracy rates, in other words, as inequality increased, piracy levels decreased, and that the 
effect of income on piracy rates depended on a country’s geographic region. Finally, the 
model predicted an inverted U-shaped relationship between piracy and per capita income, 
where piracy increased initially as income rose, and then decreased with further increases 
in income.  
                                                 
5
  Piracy rates are defined to be the estimated number of pirated copies produced and sold as a 
fraction of the sum of all copies produced (both legitimate and pirate) 
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In another study building on the concepts of individualism-collectivism (Marron and 
Steel, 1997), CD prices (Hui and Png, 2002), and income inequality (Fischer and Andres, 
2005), Eyun-Jung Ki et al. (2006) used seven variables as determinants influencing music 
piracy rates across 71 countries. These included individualism-collectivism, the level of 
education, intellectual property protection, music CD price, music market size, income 
level, and income inequality. Of these variables, the study found that income level, 
income inequality, and market size had a significant impact on domestic piracy rates.  
The underlying premise of most recent research has been that piracy over the past six 
years has adversely affected recording industry revenues, contributing to their persistent 
slump since 2001. The focus of most research has been the impact of piracy on CD sales, 
specifically digital piracy and the effects of peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing, stream-
casting, and other forms of Internet piracy stemming from the Napster model of “free” 
digital music distribution.  Following this trend, Peitz and Waelbroeck (2004) analyzed 
the role of music downloading on the downturn in CD sales. They used 2000-2001 cross-
country data for 16 developed economies and controlled CD sales data for GDP, percent 
of adults downloading, broadband penetration, the ratio of Music Cassette sales to CD 
sales, and the number of CD sales per household. The study concluded that Internet 
piracy significantly accounted for the decline in CD sales in 2001.  
For the purposes of data availability and consistency, this and other studies on music 
piracy use data from the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), the 
leading international music trade organization. The IFPI calculates domestic piracy rates 
as pirate units divided by legal units plus pirate units, and estimates pirate units from 
territory estimates (comprised of primary studies and seizures and enforcement) and 
optical media manufacturing research.
6
 The Federation defines piracy as “the 
unauthorized duplication of an original recording for commercial gain without the 
consent of the rights owner.”7  
There are a number of factors that could influence variation in piracy rates across 
countries and time. Among them are: (1) relative prices of pirated and legitimate CDs, (2) 
specific taste for music, (3) market size in units and composition by demand for singles, 
CDs, and DVDs, (4) quality of the legitimate music available (perceived by the 
consumer), (5) substitution with other media forms of entertainment, e.g. movies, (6) the 
country-specific economic environment, relative personal income, and income 
distribution, (7) the country-specific legal environment and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights, and taxes and tariffs imposed on legitimate media, and (8) the technology 
available to tap into new distribution channels (e.g. peer-to-peer networks) and to make 
personal copies of optical discs (CD-R and DVD burners). However, many of these 
factors cannot be measured or quantified directly and accurately, which is a problem that 
any study of piracy and consumer preference faces.  
                                                 
6
  “Commercial Piracy Measurement” slide show presented at the WIPO/OECD expert meeting 
October 18th 2005, available at  http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/14/35650193.pdf 
7
  IFPI 2006. 
 5 
Factor (1) is difficult to measure across countries since the real price of a CD and other 
legitimate copies includes different mark-ups, tariffs, VAT taxes, and retail overhead that 
vary considerably within and among countries, and average prices do not capture the 
reality of these price differences. Factor (2) could be observed through top music charts 
and other billboard information, but is difficult to measure accurately across countries 
and time, and measurements are lacking in many developing economies.  Factor (4) is 
also subjective and difficult to measure.  Factor (3) reflects the total legitimate demand 
for music, but it is closely related to the piracy rate and therefore we will eliminate it in 
our model. This study will not address factor (5) directly since it only affects what kinds 
of media are pirated and we assume that there is no significant substitution effect between 
music and movies and entertainment and business software that affects the overall piracy 
levels of recorded music.  
 The factors for which we have better measurements are the economic, legal, and 
technological variables that affect piracy.  We assume that factors (6), (7), and (8), which 
reflect the economic, legal and technological environments, respectively, are 
encapsulated by three proxy variables: GDP per capita, the Corruption Perceptions Index 
(henceforth CPI), and Internet subscriptions per capita.  
We note that the type of Internet access, dial-up or broadband, is important to our study 
of physical piracy. Physical piracy generally takes two forms: direct CD copying in 
pressing plants (located in countries with cheap labor and poor copyrights regulations), 
and direct or indirect copying by individuals.
8
  For physical piracy to be possible on the 
individual scale, the person must have a CD decoder/copier/burner, and either access to 
the legitimate CDs or quick and cheap access to a musical “inventory” via the Internet.  
Although broadband penetration is more likely to be strongly correlated with piracy than 
dial-up access, since file transfers of music are easier with broadband, we will use 
Internet access per capita as our technology variable since we do not have consistent data 
for all years and countries for broadband access. Also, data is lacking for CD burners for 
all countries during the time period under consideration, and therefore we exclude the 
effects of this factor on physical piracy. 
This research builds on the previous findings by employing international panel time 
series data to examine variations in piracy rates across countries and time, particularly the 
discrepancies in piracy rates between developed and developing economies. We employ 
the Fischer and Andres (2005) measures for the level of economic development, namely 
GDP per capita, and the Eyun-Jung Ki et al. (2006) measure for demand, namely market 
size, in addition to new measures that account for the impact of technology and the legal 
environment on piracy levels. Specifically, we substitute Marron and Steel’s (1997) 
concept of individualism-collectivism for a measure of corruption, a proxy for the 
                                                 
8
  By “direct” copy we mean, a one-for-one copy of an original CD, where all of the tracks are the 
same and in the same order. By contrast, an “indirect” copy, although it may contain all tracks from a given 
album accessed on the Internet, may also contain a different mix of original songs pulled from different 
albums. In practice, many of these “indirect” copies are under titles such as “Greatest Hits” or a selection of 
the Top 40 charts tracks.  
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effectiveness of the legal system, relevant to the enforcement of licensing and intellectual 
property rights regulations, and we add factors to account for technological differences 
between countries, like broadband and Internet users per 1000 people, as proxies for 
Internet piracy activity.  
 
3 Data Description 
 
We define our data as follows: 
pr  Piracy rates, sales of pirated copies as 
percent of total pirate and legitimate 
bb000  Broadband subscriptions per 1000 
people 
int000  Internet access per 1000 people 
pc000  Personal computers per 1000 people 
totunpc1  Total units of recorded music purchased 
per person per year 
usdpc1  US $ value of recorded music purchases 
per person per year 
gdppc  GDP per capita, PPP (year 2000 
constant international $) 
corp  Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 
We selected the countries on the basis of the most complete and thorough data available 
for the time span we chose to study, 1999-2005. Appendix A gives a complete list of the 
countries included. We choose 1999 as our starting year since it was the year when 
Napster was created and other technological changes became important to the recording 
industry, including the more widespread use of computers, the Internet, and broadband.  
All of the models are based on data of annual frequency for 1999-2004. Some values for 
given countries and years are missing from the original data sources, and some sources 
have data for 2005. Piracy rates data is available for 1999-2005, however all years in that 
span are not available for all countries.
 Sales data comes from the IFPI’s Recording 
Industry World Sales reports for 1999-2004 and are given in market size and USD value.
9
 
The CPI is an index of corruption confidence (scaled from 1-10, 10 denoting full 
confidence and zero corruption), generated by Transparency International. Finally, we 
take our economic data for all countries except Taiwan, from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators until the most current year available for gdppc, pc000, bb000, 
int000. The data for Taiwan is taken from government sources and estimates, and is 
adjusted by the author for consistency with the WDI data.  
                                                 
9
  All piracy rates and recording industry world sales data are used with the permission of the IFPI. 
 7 
There are several potential problems with our data sample. First, we have missing values 
for some countries for particular years and for some variables, largely due to the number 
of countries included in the sample. However, we have tried to gather the most complete 
and thorough data available for the years and countries presented.  Second, proxy data 
have disadvantages in that they may not accurately capture reality; however, we use 
proxies since direct, consistent measurements are not available and the proxies we use are 
generally accepted and come from leading sources. Furthermore, the IFPI and other 
research have recognized the potential inadequacy of the piracy rates measure (which 
estimates the pirated units purchased as a percent of all units purchased) in reflecting 
sales losses due to copyrights violations. Particularly, piracy levels for developed 
countries underestimate actual sales losses to copyright violations because online piracy 
may be contributing to low piracy levels estimates. It may be the case that physical piracy 
decreases with increases in online piracy, often proxied by broadband or Internet 
penetration in a given country, which implies a substitution effect between physical and 
online piracy. This is the main reason why we include measures for Internet penetration 
in our study.  
 Descriptive Statistics  
Average global piracy rates have risen over the past five years and total nearly 40% in 
2005 (see Figure 1). There are considerable differences in the trends of piracy rates 
between non-OECD (developing) countries and OECD (developed) countries.
10
 OECD 
countries have exhibited declining average piracy rates since 2000 that have leveled off at 
about 10% on average, while non-OECD countries have exhibited growing average 
piracy rates at over 50% on average in 2005. Note that the average piracy rates for OECD 
and non-OECD countries are substantially different. These differences in our 
composition of data for the dependent variable indicate a heterogeneous sample with two 
subgroups.   
Tables 1a-c give descriptive statistics for all countries, non-OECD countries and OECD 
countries, countries respectively. For all countries, the number of Internet users and 
personal computers per 1000 people has increased moderately over the past five years, 
growing from 117 and 157, respectively, in 1999 to 310 and 279, respectively, in 2004. In 
2004 Internet users per 1000 people outnumber PCs because of the growing availability 
of Internet access to people who don’t own PCs. At the same time, the base of broadband 
subscribers has been growing exponentially since 1999, and in 2004 the average number 
of subscribers per 1000 people was 71, up from around 6 in 2000. However, these 
increases are disproportional in OECD countries. Non-OECD countries average at about 
three times fewer Internet users per 1000 people than OECD countries, and about four 
times fewer personal computers per 1000 people.  
Over the past five years, the average total units of recorded music purchased per person 
has fallen cumulatively by over 45 % of its 1999 value, from about 2 units per person on 
average in 1999 to less than one unit in 2004. Meanwhile, the average dollar spending on 
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  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, original members. 
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music purchases has also decreased from about $13.58 per person per year in 1999, to 
about $11.13 in 2002, (a decrease of about 18% of the 1999 value) and risen slightly 
since then to $12.32 in 2004 (a decrease of about 9% of the 1999 value). Decreases in the 
US dollar value, however, have not been adjusted to reflect inflation, and in real terms the 
value of music purchased may be much lower.  
The average GDP per capita for all countries increased slightly from about $14,800 in 
1999 to about $ 16,500 in 2004. The average GDP for the entire 1999-2004 period was 
about $15,700, including the biased value for 2005, and about $13,000 excluding the 
2005 value. Meanwhile, the average corruption index has stayed at around 5.5 over the 
past six years – a value that indicates that the sample of countries we selected was 
composed proportionally of countries with high corruption (denoted by a low confidence 
index, specifically below 5) and countries with low corruption (denoted by a high 
confidence index, specifically above 5).   
Figures 2a-c show co-behavioral plots of our dependent variable, piracy rates, and our 
leading independent variables: corruption, Internet access, and income per capita, 
respectively. The differences between non-OECD and OECD countries are evident in 
these plots. Non-OECD countries generally have higher piracy rates, lower Internet 
access, lower indexes of corruption confidence, and lower incomes per capita than OECD 
countries.  
It is important to note that during the period under consideration, 1999-2004, OECD 
countries adopted broadband Internet access much more quickly and more widely than 
non-OECD (developing) countries. Moreover, many non-OECD countries were just 
beginning to adopt dial-up Internet technologies on a more massive scale beginning in 
2000.  
The type of Internet access available to individuals is a critical element to our discussion, 
since it influences the ability of an individual to pirate music.  For example, broadband 
connectivity allows for faster file-transfer from peer-to-peer networks than dial-up. The 
consideration of broadband is important since physical piracy generally takes two forms: 
direct CD copying in pressing plants (located in countries with cheap labor and poor 
copyrights regulations), and direct or indirect copying by individuals.  For physical piracy 
to be possible on the individual scale, the person must have a CD decoder/copier/burner, 
and either access to the legitimate CDs or quick and cheap access to a musical 
“inventory” via the Internet. One of the reasons why piracy rates of any kind are very low 
or non-existent in many African countries is because the necessary technology (fast 
Internet access and computers) for unauthorized copying is unavailable to many 
individuals.  
 
 9 
Estimation Results 
Cross-sectional time series data analysis is best suited for studying changes in piracy 
rates across countries and time for several reasons. First, this analysis reflects both cross-
sectional differences (between countries), and time-series differences (within a given 
country for a set period of time). Panel data regression techniques allow us to examine 
these differences and to assess their impact on piracy rates independently. Second, panel 
data allows us to control for omitted variables that differ between cases but are constant 
over time, and for omitted variables that vary over time but are constant between cases. 
11
 
While it is possible to use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression techniques on panel 
data, they may not be optimal. OLS assumes a homogeneous sample of data, which is 
often not the case with real world data. Therefore, we examine several other models for 
panel data: the fixed effects, FE, the between effects, BE, and the random effects, RE, 
models, to select the optimal choice for our data.   
The general form of a panel data model is: 
yit =  +  it xit + uit 
where the error term uit  ~ iid(0, 
2
) and i = 1,2,......., N individual-level observations, and 
t = 1,2,.......,T time series observations. We assume that yit (the piracy rate) is a 
continuous rather than a discrete measure. The model reflects changes in the dependent 
variable yit over countries (i) and time (t). Therefore, yit is the piracy level for a specific 
country and year, and  and β it are constants.    
The fixed effects model is appropriate when yit is heteroskedastic in x. The FE model 
fixes different averages of the dependent variable, pr, for each country or each time 
period, but assumes that the variance of the errors will not change across countries or 
time. In such a case, random effects estimation would give inconsistent estimates of the 
coefficient β it in the model. The RE and BE models are appropriate when yit is 
homoskedastic in x, that is, when the mean of the uit error terms is zero.
12
  
From our descriptive statistics, we observed different means for our dependent variable, 
piracy rates, for OECD and non-OECD countries, implying a heterogeneous sample of 
data. We also observed substantial correlation in some of our raw data and some non-
normality and autocorrelation in the residuals. Therefore we eliminated some variables 
that were highly correlated and performed log transformations on other variables in this 
data. We transformed Internet per 1000 people into the log of Internet per capita, lnint, 
and GDP per capita into the log of gdppc, lngdppc. We also eliminated pc000 and bb000 
as variables because they had less data available and were correlated with Internet 
subscriptions, and we removed totunpc1 and usdpc1 since they were correlated with 
piracy rates. We excluded dummy variables coding for individual countries and years 
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  Available at http://dss.princeton.edu/online_help/analysis/panel.htm, accessed July 20, 2006.  
12
  Available at http://economics.about.com, accessed July 20, 2006. 
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since they were not statistically significant. However, even after these transformations, 
there was some autocorrelation left in the residuals, which we chose to accept.   
In all our model specifications, we included the independent variables, xit, for each 
country and time period: the log of Internet subscriptions per capita with expected sign 
ambiguous, lnint, log of real income per capita with expected sign (-), lngdppc, the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) with expected sign (-), corp, and a dummy variable 
coding for “developed” OECD countries.13 Note that real income per capita   proxies the 
economic conditions in a given country for a given year, Internet access proxies the 
technological factors influencing piracy levels, and the corruption index proxies the legal 
environment that impacts copyrights and intellectual property legislation and efficacy.  
First, we ran robust OLS regressions for all countries and then for OECD and non-OECD 
countries to conduct a preliminary analysis of the variables. Our best all-country OLS 
model chose three statistically significant variables: lngdppc, corp, and a dummy variable 
for “developed” (OECD) countries. Among these factors, the corruption coefficient was 
the most highly significant and with the expected negative sign, followed by the dummy 
variable for developed, also with a negative sign, and GDP per capita, also with a 
negative sign. Internet access was not significant in the all-country OLS model. The 
adjusted R-squared of this model was 0.577 with 364 observations (see Table 2a).  
The significant difference in mean piracy rates between OECD and non-OECD countries 
prompted us to separate the sample. We ran OLS regressions for OECDs and non-
OECDs and our findings were consistent with the all-country OLS, where the coefficients 
for corp and lngdppc were negative and significant across both groups. Our OLS results 
indicated that differences in legal enforcement and the standard of living were significant 
in explaining piracy variations. The coefficient of lnint exhibited a positive sign for non-
OECD countries and a negative sign for OECD countries, but was insignificant in the 
OLS estimation.  
To evaluate the appropriateness of the RE model for our data, we first ran the Breusch 
and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for uit =0, the essential assumption of the RE and 
BE models. The test strongly rejected the null hypothesis in the all-country and 
OECD/non-OECD regressions (Table 2a-c). Therefore the RE and BE models were 
inappropriate for our data.   
We followed this analysis with a Hausman specification test to check whether our model 
was correctly specified. If a FE model is correctly specified, and if uit is uncorrelated with 
xit, the coefficients that are estimated by the fixed-effects estimator and the same 
coefficients that are estimated by the random-effects estimator should not be statistically 
different. That is, we would retain the null hypothesis of no systematic differences in the 
coefficients of the RE and the FE models. In our case, we retained the null hypothesis of 
no systematic differences in the coefficients (see Table 2a-c).  
                                                 
13
  The Corruption Perceptions Index measures are published annually by Transparency International 
and available at www.transparency.org 
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We proceeded to run an all-country FE model. The adjusted r-squared for the all-country 
FE model was .508. This model found only Internet access as significant across all 
countries. In other words, income per capita and legal enforcement were not significant 
factors in explaining differences in piracy rates across countries for 1999-2004. The 
Internet coefficient, 3.191, was highly significant and with a positive sign implying that a 
one percent increase in Internet access on average resulted in about a 3% increase in 
physical piracy across all countries during this period.  
To examine the differences between developed and developing countries, we ran two 
more FE models for OECD and non-OECD countries. Dividing the sample by 
“developed” eliminated the significance of the income variable, since income per capita 
and a country’s status as an OECD member are closely related.  For non-OECDs, Internet 
and corruption were both significant variables. Moreover, the Internet coefficient was 
positive, implying an increase in piracy rates with increases in Internet subscriptions, 
while the corruption index coefficient was negative, implying a decrease in piracy rates 
with increases in the confidence index (less corruption perceived).  Surprisingly, none of 
the variables were significant for OECD countries, and the sign of the Internet coefficient 
was negative, as in the OLS estimation. These differences in the sign of the Internet 
variable and in its significance may be due to the smaller sample in the OECD category, 
N=123, as compared to the non-OECD category, N=241. Although our results for the 
OECD countries have less explanatory power due to the relatively smaller sample size, 
the negative sign of the Internet coefficient could suggest that piracy rates have decreased 
as Internet subscriptions increased during 1999-2004. A larger sample of OECD 
countries would be needed, however, to confirm this finding.  
Overall, we find that there are no significant temporal effects on piracy rates across time. 
Importantly, the all-country FE model, which we take to be the most valid all-country 
model, indicates that income and legal enforcement do not explain much of the variation 
in piracy across countries. We find that piracy rates variations among all countries are 
largely due to growing Internet access. For non-OECD countries, our results indicate that 
the increase in Internet access coupled with poor copyrights enforcement has worsened 
physical piracy. One explanation is that more individuals with access to the Internet are 
making home copies of downloaded music and selling it on the black market.  In OECD 
countries, the growth in Internet subscriptions has not affected physical piracy rates. An 
explanation may be that people with access to the Internet purchase music online legally 
or download it illegally but are prevented from making pirated copies and selling them on 
the market because of the legal and economic conditions in OECD countries.  
4 Conclusion  
In this research, we tested several models for panel data, beginning with ordinary least-
squares and proceeding with random effects, between effects, and fixed effects models to 
find an optimal choice for our data.  The best fit for our data was the fixed-effects model 
with three variables: Internet access (a proxy for technology), GDP per capita (a proxy 
for the economic environment), and the corruption perceptions index (a proxy for legal 
enforcement).  
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As with other studies, we found the economic factors to be significant, since they were 
closely related to OECD membership. We also found our legal enforcement variables to 
be significant, but only for developing countries. The fixed-effects model for the entire 
sample of countries indicated that income per capita and corruption were insignificant in 
explaining piracy variations across countries during 1999-2004.  
Most surprisingly, however, our findings suggest that growing access to the Internet has 
contributed significantly to rising piracy rates in developing countries, but has had no 
significant impact on piracy rates in developed countries. This finding is original since it 
suggests a relationship between access to the Internet and the growth of physical piracy in 
developing countries. This phenomenon is unique to developing countries and may be 
due to the nature of the piracy being measured and the specific economic and legal 
situations in developing countries. Continuing piracy may be a factor of differences in 
prices between original and pirated copies, and discrepancies in access to copying 
technology and the Internet. For example, with growing Internet access, more people are 
making home copies of downloaded music and making a business from selling them on 
the black market.   
Further research might explore the nature of this relationship between Internet and 
physical piracy. For example, in developed economies, the decrease in piracy rates may 
be due to a substitution between Internet and physical piracy. It could be that as more 
people gain fast access to the Internet, they will either purchase music legally or 
download illegally with the same final result – a decrease in pirate copies of CDs and 
other physical formats. Growing legitimate sales over the Internet in recent years are 
potent evidence that market solutions to piracy are viable for countries where the 
computer and Internet per capita base is large enough and mechanisms for online 
transactions exist at a low per unit cost.  
With the growth of technology, creating more business alternatives for developing 
countries will be essential to curbing the sales of pirated copies and creating a functioning 
market. Unfortunately, part of the problem for developing countries is poor technological 
infrastructure, which is why CDs are popular in the first place rather than free content 
providers like YouTube, which require hardware and Internet service. The lack of 
adequate access to technology may deter the development of market solutions. In the 
meantime, other non-market mechanisms may help alleviate the piracy problem in 
developing economies, such as sound copyrights enforcement, improved technological 
security of digital delivery formats, and monitoring of illegal market activity.  
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Table 1a. Descriptive Statistics for All Countries 
 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
pr overall 38.065 28.392 1.000 99.000 N 477 
 between  27.336 1.000 99.000 n 69 
 within  7.883 13.208 91.208 T-bar 6.91304 
        
corp overall 5.479 2.392 1.500 10.000 N 444 
 between  2.333 1.860 9.771 n 69 
 within  0.286 3.979 6.736 T-bar 6.43478 
        
gdppc overall 15738.820 9692.119 1858.000 36464.680 N 408 
 between  9720.090 1944.667 34633.990 n 68 
 within  893.992 10359.110 20346.110 T-bar 6 
        
int000 overall 212.662 187.407 0.218 787.983 N 414 
 between  170.170 0.350 639.279 n 69 
 within  81.327 -49.713 511.372 T-bar 6 
        
bb000 overall 28.815 48.237 0.000 247.939 N 303 
 between  38.222 0.000 189.450 n 68 
 within  27.902 -78.309 134.271 T-bar 4.45588 
        
pc000 overall 217.414 204.749 1.000 1163.078 N 410 
 between  190.098 6.333 679.011 n 69 
 within  80.349 0.588 1090.291 T-bar 5.94203 
        
usdpc1 overall 12.169 15.096 0.023 59.842 N 383 
 between  15.018 0.082 55.296 n 65 
 within  2.127 4.779 23.196 T-bar 5.89231 
        
totunpc1 overall 1.254 2.129 0.017 28.033 N 385 
 between  1.546 0.040 10.173 n 65 
  within   1.468 -7.072 19.114 T-bar 5.92308 
Sources: IFPI World Sales and Piracy Reports 1999-2005, World Bank WDI 1999-2004, Transparency 
International Corruption Perceptions Index 1999-2005.   
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Table 1b. Descriptive Statistics for non-OECD Countries 
 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
pr overall 49.90964 24.440 5 99 N 332 
 between  23.317 9.833 99 n 48 
 within  7.935 27.767 74.910 T-bar 6.91667 
        
corp overall 4.186254 1.672 1.50 9.4 N 291 
 between  1.646 1.86 9.257 n 47 
 within  0.283 3.220 5.443 T-bar 6.19149 
        
gdppc overall 10475.9 6541.219 1858 29087.00 N 277 
 between  6497.056 1944.667 25870.08 n 46 
 within  883.378 5096.181 15083.18 T-bar 6.02174 
        
int000 overall 132.5013 137.367 0.218247 656.792 N 283 
 between  118.272 0.349521 495.337 n 47 
 within  71.532 -129.874 378.890 T-bar 6.02128 
        
bb000 overall 16.10403 42.488 0 247.939 N 197 
 between  36.310 0 189.4504 n 46 
 within  18.108 -91.0204 97.25096 T-bar 4.28261 
        
pc000 overall 128.6398 151.753 1 1163.078 N 279 
 between  129.923 6.333333 561.1352 n 47 
 within  84.179 -72.2273 1001.517 T-bar 5.93617 
        
usdpc1 overall 3.315762 3.297 0.022695 16.23406 N 260 
 between  3.180 0.081828 14.38941 n 44 
 within  0.968 0.709687 8.530487 T-bar 5.90909 
        
totunpc1 overall 0.500766 0.390 0.016791 2.044181 N 260 
 between  0.363 0.03955 1.428033 n 44 
  within   0.146 0.052799 1.194202 T-bar 5.90909 
Sources: IFPI World Sales and Piracy Reports 1999-2005, World Bank WDI 1999-2004, Transparency 
International Corruption Perceptions Index 1999-2005.    
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Table 1c. Descriptive Statistics for OECD Countries 
 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
pr overall 10.94483 15.082 1 90 N 145 
 between  13.151 1 50.286 n 21 
 within  7.788 -13.912 64.088 T-bar 6.905 
        
corp overall 7.937255 1.433 4.2 10 N 153 
 between  1.455 4.467 9.771 n 22 
 within  0.293 6.437 8.737 T 6.955 
        
gdppc overall 26867.3 4409.057 16622.8 36464.68 N 131 
 between  4381.181 18077.51 34633.99 n 22 
 within  919.467 22217.92 29746.00 T 5.955 
        
int000 overall 385.8341 162.596 68.915 787.983 N 131 
 between  131.019 118.589 639.279 n 22 
 within  99.564 186.775 684.544 T 5.955 
        
bb000 overall 52.43943 49.558 0 189.449 N 106 
 between  29.155 1.2 112.120 n 22 
 within  40.337 -24.1517 157.895 T-bar 4.818 
        
pc000 overall 406.4821 172.371 58.807 826.163 N 131 
 between  159.467 77.047 679.011 n 22 
 within  71.820 189.657 614.392 T 5.955 
        
usdpc1 overall 30.88372 13.049 6.482 59.842 N 123 
 between  12.698 7.966 55.296 n 21 
 within  3.490 23.493 41.911 T-bar 5.857 
        
totunpc1 overall 2.821976 3.171 0.645 28.033 N 125 
 between  1.882 0.738 10.173 n 21 
  within   2.574 -5.505 20.682 T-bar 5.952 
Sources: IFPI World Sales and Piracy Reports 1999-2005, World Bank WDI 1999-2004, Transparency 
International Corruption Perceptions Index 1999-2005.    
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Table 2a. Regression Analysis for All Countries, Dependent Variable – Piracy Rate 
  OLS RE FE 
lnint 0.483 2.880 3.191 
 (0.600) (3.49) (3.260) 
lngdppc -11.455 -14.088 -12.348 
 (-3.980) (-3.26) (-1.450) 
corp -3.639 -3.444 -2.388 
 (-5.060) (-2.82) (-1.440) 
developed -13.495 -14.945  
 (-4.870) (-2.34)  
N 364 364 364 
Adj. R
2 
0.577 0.567 0.508 
Breusch and 
Pagan Prob> 
chi2  0.0000*  
Hausman test 
Prob> chi2   0.4318 
  
 
Note: t-statistics reported in parentheses; t≥|2| indicates significance at the 5% level or greater. Constants 
not reported. * denotes statistically significant  
Table 2b. Regression Analysis for non-OECD Countries, Dependent Variable –
Piracy Rate 
  OLS RE FE 
lnint 0.527 2.886 3.024 
 (0.640) (3.36) (3.06) 
lngdppc -10.987 -10.513 -8.005 
 (-3.240) (-2.08) (-0.92) 
corp -3.634 -5.117 -5.164 
 (-3.240) (-3.19) (-2.58) 
N 241 241 241 
Adj. R
2 
0.256 0.238 0.227 
Breusch and 
Pagan Prob> 
chi2  0.0000*  
Hausman test 
Prob> chi2   0.6944 
  
 
Note: t-statistics reported in parentheses; t≥|2| indicates significance at the 5% level or greater. Constants 
not reported. * denotes statistically significant  
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Table 2c. Regression Analysis for OECD Countries, Dependent Variable – Piracy 
Rate 
  OLS RE FE 
 lnint -0.360 1.906 -0.986 
 (-0.170) (0.62) (-0.22) 
 lngdppc -27.243 -27.910 6.212 
 (-5.300) (-1.84) (0.16) 
 corp -3.136 -2.091 3.583 
 (-3.360) (-1.26) (1.12) 
 N 123 123 123 
 Adj. R
2 
0.253 0.240 0.209 
 Breusch and  
 Pagan Prob>  
 chi2  0.0000*  
 Hausman test 
 Prob> chi2   0.1727 
  
 
Note: t-statistics reported in parentheses; t≥|2| indicates significance at the 5% level or greater. Constants 
not reported. * denotes statistically significant 
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Fig. 1 Mean Piracy Rates, 1999-2005 
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Fig. 2a Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) v. Piracy Rates, 2004 
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Sources: IFPI and Transparency International, 2004.  
 
Fig. 2b Internet per 1000 People v. Piracy Rates, 2004 
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Sources: IFPI and World Bank, 2004.  
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Fig. 2c GDP per capita v. Piracy Rates, 2004 
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Sources: IFPI and World Bank, 2004. 
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Appendix A 
Country list
 Argentina 
Australia* 
Austria* 
Bahrain 
Belgium* 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Canada* 
Central America 
Chile 
China 
Columbia 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark* 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
Estonia 
Finland* 
France* 
Germany* 
Greece* 
Hong Kong 
Hungary 
Iceland* 
India 
Indonesia 
Ireland* 
Israel 
Italy* 
Japan* 
Korea, Rep. of 
Kuwait 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lithuania 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Netherlands* 
New Zealand 
Norway* 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal* 
Qatar 
Romania 
Russia 
Saudi Arabia 
Singapore 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
South Africa 
Spain* 
Sweden* 
Switzerland* 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
Turkey* 
UAE 
UK* 
Ukraine 
Uruguay 
USA* 
Venezuela 
Zimbabwe
* Original OECD members
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